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Privatization became a central element of economic reforms in most countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa during the 1990s. Yet, empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
privatization remains scarce. Since the seminal work of CAMPBELL-WHITE  & BHATIA 
[1998], covering transactions on the African continent until 1996, no comprehensive 
assessment has been conducted. At a time when public opposition to further privatization 
is growing, this paper aims at giving a broad overview of the impact of privatization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2002 in the light of recent developments, and to derive 
some general trends and conclusions from the body of empirical evidence available to 
date.  During this period, about 2300 privatization transactions have taken place, 
generating a total sales value estimated at US$ 9 billion. The main findings on the impact 
of privatization are as follows: first, privatization has had a minimal one-off impact on the 
budget; second, firm turnover and profitability have generally increased immediately 
following privatization but the evidence is mixed regarding the sustainability of the initial 
post-privatization upswing; third, employment has been adversely affected by 
privatization, although the latter has not resulted in massive layoffs in absolute terms; 
fourth, FDI and stock markets have played a limited role in privatization transactions 
despite some showcase transactions; fifth, regulation and competition have often been   
overlooked in the privatization process, and even where they have been dealt with, 
enforcement problems have greatly limited their effectiveness; sixth, privatization has 
created new political patronage opportunities, leading to numerous corruption scandals 
which have damaged the credibility of the privatization process; finally, social aspects of 
privatizations have generally been overlooked, reflecting the tendency to focus on 
privatization transactions, rather than on sector reorganization at large including wider 
social objectives. 
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Privatization became a central element of economic reforms in most countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa during the 1990s, putting increasing emphasis on private sector 
development. As elsewhere, privatization policies in Africa were aimed at enhancing the 
efficiency of resource allocation via increased competition, providing fiscal benefits to 
cash-strapped governments, attracting more private investment and improving the access 
of the private sector to finance in general. As a result, privatization has become “the 
superordinate medium-long term objective of adjustment programs everywhere in Africa” 
BENNEL [1997] (p.1785). At the same time, public discontent and opposition to 
privatization programs has gained ground in various regions, including in Africa. Most 
criticism voiced by the local press, Parliaments but also NGOs and academics rests on the 
alleged adverse affects of privatization on unemployment and on the poor, and on 
perceptions of widespread corruption in the privatization process. The case of Zambia is a 
case in point: on the one hand, Zambia’s privatization program has been praised by many 
observers during the 1990s in terms of government commitment, preparatory work, 
transparency in execution and legal framework
2; on the other hand, corruption scandals in 
some key transactions
3 and the pull-out of Anglo American from the KCM copper mine in 
2002 have led to strong resistance to further privatizations from parliamentarians and the 
population at large
4. The same resistance can be observed in other countries such as Benin, 
Ghana, and in Kenya, particularly related to the privatization of public utilities. Ironically, 
privatization has almost become a “bad word”, but very little is known about its impact in 
most countries except at the anecdotal level. Since the seminal work of CAMPBELL-WHITE 
& BHATIA [1998], covering transactions on the African continent to 1996, no 
comprehensive assessment has been conducted, with the exception of a special section on 
privatization policies in Africa in OECD [2003] and a first review attempt by NELLIS 
[2003]. The prime objective of this paper is to shed some light on the impact of 
privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, updating the work of Campbell-White & Bathia in the 
light of recent developments, and to try to derive some general trends and conclusions 
from the body of empirical evidence available to date. Section 2 conducts a statistical 
overview of privatization across Sub-Saharan Africa between 1991 and 2002. Section 3 
discusses various dimensions of the impact on privatization, covering enterprise 
performance, unemployment, FDI and capital markets, regulation and competition, 
governance, and income distribution impact. Due to data limitation, the discussion is 
primarily aimed at stimulating the debate on these important issues, but does not constitute 
an exhaustive analysis at this stage. Finally, section 4 draws some key lessons from the 






                                                 
2 See CAMPBELL-WHITE & BATHIA [1998], pp.111-112 
3 For example, the sale of the Luanshya division of ZZCM mines in 1997. 
4 For example, the website www.zamnet.zm/zamnet/post/post.html  hosts a  "live" debate regarding the 
controversial privatization of Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB), which is a binding condition for 
the further release of debt relief funds under the HIPC initiative.   
  22. Privatization across Sub-Saharan Africa 1991-2002: a Statistical Overview 
 
Like any other statistical exercise in Sub-Saharan Africa, compiling data on privatization 
transactions and sales value is not an easy task. The data reported here comes primarily 
from the privatization database, which is being maintained by the World Bank Africa 
Region. The following caveat is important to note:  the database seems to be incomplete, 
particularly in recent years. To be sure, there are differences among information sources. 
For instance, there are discrepancies between the Africa Region database and the data 
gathered by CAMPBELL-WHITE & BATHIA [1998] in their detailed study of privatization, most 
notably on sales value data.  When the comparison is extended to the seminal work of 
BENNEL [1997], similar problems arise. These problems are not new, and stem from the fact 
that the final stages of many privatization transactions are often confusing and may involve 
unexpected developments. Typically, Governments list state-owned enterprises (thereafter 
“SOEs”) as “divested” when an agreement is signed between the authorities and a private 
buyer, but transfers may be subsequently cancelled for a variety of reasons (e.g. buyer’s 
failure to honor payment, government’s failure to approve the deal etc.). However, such 
transfers could well show in privatization statistics, and when the same enterprises are 
again lined up for privatization, “new” transactions are reported, hence the obvious 
problem of multiple accounting. The cut-off date for reporting a transaction as “final” is 
therefore sensitive, and it is actually an important source of noise in the data
5. In addition, 
firms are sometimes broken up into various companies, which complicates measurement. 
For instance, Cote d’Ivoire’s Palmindustrie was broken up into 13 companies in the 
privatization process. Depending on the methodology used, it is either reported as 1 sale or 
as 13 sales.  
 
With this caveat in mind, the main findings of the statistical analysis are the following: 
 
Between 1991 and 2002, roughly 2300 privatization transactions were recorded, with total 
sales value estimated at around US$ 9 billion (see Table 1). As shown in Chart 1, 
privatization transactions followed a bell-shape pattern, peaking in the mid-nineties. 
Overall, privatization activity seems to have concentrated on Eastern and Southern Africa 
(Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda) and Ghana, with these six countries 
accounting for 60% of the total number of transactions. In terms of sales value of 
transactions however, the picture is slightly different, as South Africa alone accounts for 
35% of total sales revenue; the other key players include Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Cote 
d’Ivoire, and these 5 countries together account for 70% of total (see Chart 2). This 
illustrates the fact that there is no correlation between the number of transactions and the 
total sales value, a point already made in previous studies.  
 
Privatization seems to have been far-reaching in Zambia, Mali, Togo, Kenya, the Gambia 
and Ghana, where the share of state-owned enterprises divested since the mid-1980s ranges 
from 70 to 90%. By contrast, countries with less comprehensive privatization programs (0-
10% of state-owned enterprises divested) include Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe. These are very rough estimates, however, as the total number of state-owned 
                                                 
5 See PAULSON [1999], pp.234-235 on the so-called phenomenon of “redivestiture”. 
  3enterprises at the beginning of the privatization process is not always easy to gauge
6 and is 
very sensitive to public sector definition and coverage. 
 





















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa South Africa
                                                 
6 In some cases (e.g. Mozambique), the number of divested companies exceeds the official number of SOEs. 
In addition, no account was taken for newly established state enterprises parastatals since the mid-1980s (e.g. 
Senegal). 
 





Sale Value (US$ 
mn) 
Share of total 
SOEs 
divested 
 Angola (*)  57 6 ...
 Benin  28 49 38%
 Burkina Faso  23 9 32%
 Burundi  38 4 ...
 Cameroon  48 244  28%
 Cape Verde  44 53 ...
 Central African Republic  18 ... 50%
 Chad  35 12 ...
 Congo (Brazzaville)  67 50 ...
 Congo (Kinshasa)  5 ... 4%
 Côte d’Ivoire  82 622 55%
 Ethiopia (*)  10 410 6%
 Gabon (*)  1 ... 6%
 Gambia  17 2.4 85%
 Ghana  181 936.5 69%
 Guinea  31 45 27%
 Guinea Bissau  25 0.5 64%
 Kenya  189 381 79%
 Lesotho  10 6.5 20%
 Madagascar  61 16.9 33%
 Malawi  11 53.2 44%
 Mali  59 67.4 92%
 Mauritania  19 1.2 20%
 Mozambique  474 135 39%
 Níger  10 1.8 18%
 Nigeria  30 893.5 6%
 Rwanda  1 … 3%
 Sao Tome & Principe  4 0.4 ...
 Senegal  39 415 23%
 Sierra Leone  8 1.6 31%
 South Africa  8 3151 ...
 Sudan  32 ... ...
 Tanzania  199 287 53%
 Togo  49 38 89%
 Uganda  102 174 79%
 Zambia  253 828 90%
 Zimbabwe  6 217 10%
Total  2273  9111.9 Average: 40%
Sources: Africa Region Privatization Database, World Bank, 2003; WDI database 1991-2000; IMF Staff Country 
Reports, 1998-2003; BENNEL [1997], Table 1, CAMPBELL WHITE & BHATIA [1998], Appendix A  
Notes:  The share of total State-Owned Enterprises divested was obtained in using BENNEL [1997] data (state-owned 
enterprises as of mid-1980s) and correcting for privatization operations which took place between the mid-
1980s and 1990.  
  (*) In the case of Angola, the authorities have reported 275 additional privatization transactions, but no 
information is available regarding the sector, the year and the firms actually privatized. In the same category,  
115 additional transactions were reported by Ethiopia and 25 by Gabon, with no information whatsoever. These 
transactions (total: 415) are excluded from Table 1. 





























In terms of sectoral distribution, the picture emerging from the CAMPBELL & WHITE [1998] 
study remains valid: the bulk of privatization transactions has taken place in 
manufacturing and industry, followed by agriculture, services, tourism and real estate (see 
Chart 4). Public utilities and energy remain far behind, and quite interestingly, public 
utilities privatization did not accelerate throughout the second half of the 1990s (see Chart 
5)
7. This situation could change, however, with many transactions involving utilities are 
currently under way (as of 2003), mostly in Western and Central Africa. Currently, average 
government share of equity in those sectors (energy, electricity, water and telecoms) 
remains sizable after privatization, i.e. ranging from 12% to 40%, as shown in Table 2. 
This contrasts with all the other sectors where government (average) share after 
privatization is roughly 6%. As usual, general averages hide sizable country differences, 













                                                 
7 This assessment could be biased by the data-reporting problem referred to when discussing the database, 
however. 
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  7Table 2. Government’s share of equity before and after privatization 
 
Sector  Average Government’s share of equity   (%)
Manufacturing & Industry  Before privatization  79.7
 After  privatization  7.9
Agriculture, Agroindustry & Fisheries  Before privatization  79.5
  After privatization  1.6
Services, Tourism & Real estate  Before privatization  70.2
 After  privatization  14.3
Trade  Before privatization  95.3
  After privatization  3.3
Transport Before  privatization  97.6
 After  privatization  4.9
Financial  Before privatization  86.7
  After privatization  8.2
Energy Before  privatization  88.3
 After  privatization  46.5
Water   Before privatization  100
  After privatization  12.5
Electricity Before  privatization  100
 After  privatization  33
Telecoms  Before privatization  95.8
  After privatization  42.8
Other Before  privatization  63.3
   After privatization  10.2
Total average government’s share of equity before privatization  89.1
Total average government’s share of equity after privatization  10.3
 
 
In terms of privatization methods used throughout the decade, the bulk of transactions 
were conducted through competitive sale of either shares or assets, as shown in Table 3 
and Chart 6. Liquidation was used in 17% of transactions, and most typically in the early 
stages of privatization programs, which reflects the fact that the first SOEs to be targeted 
for privatization were often in a desperate financial situation. Quite interestingly, 
uncompetitive methods (i.e. direct sales of shares or assets, preemptive rights) were used 
extensively in certain key “privatizers” such as Ghana, Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, as shown 
in Table 4: in Kenya, 53% of transactions were conducted through uncompetitive 
methods
8, and the corresponding figures are 31% in Cote d’Ivoire and almost 20% in 
Ghana. Although the measure is certainly very crude, some (very) limited correlation can 
be detected between privatization methods and governance, as shown in Chart 7: 
Governance seems to be poorer in countries where uncompetitive were mostly used, and 
vice and versa.  The use of uncompetitive methods is just an illustration of how 
transparency and governance problems affected the privatization process, but transparency 
concerns no doubt go beyond the use of uncompetitive methods. Anecdotal evidence 
                                                 
8 Note however that in many cases, the firms privatized were joint ventures between public and private 
investors, with shareholders agreements stating that in the case if dissolution of the venture, the non-
dissolving partner had to be given a preemptive right to purchase the other partner’s shares. The existence of 
this legal clause explains the unusually large share of  privatizations conducted through preemptive rights in 
Kenya. 
  8shows that transparency is also a big issue in competitive sales, and in 
management/employee buyouts.  
 
Table 3. Methods of Privatization (1991-2002) 
 
Method of divestiture  Number
 Shares sold on Competitive Basis  728
 Asset sold on a competitive basis  454
 Liquidation  388
 Shares sold to Existing Shareholders with Pre-emptive Rights  158
 Lease  104
 Direct sale of shares (i.e. non-competitive)  96
 Shares sold trough public floatation  69
 Not specified  48
 Restitution to former owner  47
 Management contract  42
 Management/Employee Buyout  33
 Direct sale of assets (i.e. non-competitive)  29
 Joint-venture  28
 Free transfer of assets  12
 Transfer to Trustee  11
 Debt-Equity Swap  10
 Concession  8
 JV(D)  5
 Lease /Management contract  2
 Merger  2
TOTAL  2274
 














Table 4. Countries in which uncompetitive methods reached 20% of total 
transactions (% of transactions) 
 
Country  Direct sale of assets  Direct sale of shares  Preemptive rights 
Cote d’Ivoire  8.5%  12%  11% 
Gambia   23%   
Ghana 5%  4%  9% 
Kenya 2%    51% 
Malawi   27%   
Sao Tome    25%   
  9Chart 7. Privatization Methods and Governance: 










0% 20% 40% 60%











































40% 60% 80% 100%



































CGI:  Composite Governance Index taking into account government effectiveness, rule of law, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption. Computed from World Bank Governance Dataset 2001-
2002. Index ranges from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). 
 
Non-competitive transactions : defined as transactions processed through either direct sales of shares 
or assets without competitive bids 
 
Competitive transactions: defined as transactions processed through competitive sales of assets or 
shares but excluding direct sales, as well as other methods (management contracts, transfers, 
management/employee buyout, swaps, joint ventures etc.) 
 






  103. Impact of privatization 
 
a. Impact on Government financial flows 
 
When C AMPBELL  WHITE  & BHATIA [1998] compared the stated objectives of privatization 
programs over time across countries, they found out that one of the most important official 
motivations was fiscal. Despite several attempts to reform SOEs in the 1980s under donor 
guidance, notably by setting up data production and monitoring systems, the financial and 
economic performance of most public enterprises remained dismal, and required heavy 
subsidies from central governments. So quite logically, if fiscal considerations were the 
prime driving force of privatization, one could have expected divesture from the largest 
state-owned companies and other parastatals. In practice however, the larger enterprises 
were specifically excluded from privatization until the late 1990s, with very few 
exceptions. Worse, no fiscal monitoring was put in place to assess the impact of 
privatization, except in Tanzania and Lesotho, resulting in little idea of the expected or 
actual outcomes of privatization programs. In terms of expectations, it is fair to admit that 
the fiscal impact of privatization is bound to be dynamic over time, with a one-off stock 
effect (privatization receipts) which could be either positive or negative depending on costs 
to be covered (retrenchments, liabilities) and a subsequent positive flow effect resulting 
from the decrease in direct and indirect subsidies over time, and increased tax revenues 
arising from the privatized firms. Let’s consider each effect in detail. 
 
  In the short run, privatization has had a minimal one-off impact on the budget.  
This conclusion is actually quite clear-cut, as only a fraction share of privatization 
revenues accrued to the Government budget (Chart 9), with the notable exception of Cape 
Verde. In several countries (e.g. Zambia, Mozambique, Uganda), proceeds were channeled 
by law to specific extrabudgetary funds in order to finance specific activities or operations 
such as settling liabilities or retrenchment costs, or even supporting small-scale 
entrepreneurs
9. Given the desperate financial situation of some of the firms to be privatized 
in certain countries, privatization receipts have often been completely wiped out in settling 
liabilities or severance payments, without considering serious transparency problems. In 
Zambia for instance, there were no net proceeds at all to be transferred to the privatization 
revenue fund. Finally, in some countries, privatization proceeds could still be outstanding: 
in Ghana for instance, a substantial portion of the proceeds has yet to be collected. One 
should also point out that in almost all countries, the actual value of some individual sales 
has been close to an obsession and has fueled considerable political debate (see Box 1 for 
the example of Zambia’s ZCCM copper mines). 
 
  On average, the overall remaining level of subsidization after more than a decade of 
privatization is an open question mark, although there is limited evidence that direct 
subsidies decreased dramatically 
The lack of data makes it very difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the evolution of 
(net) financial transactions between the government and former public enterprises over 
time. The problem is especially acute for indirect subsidies, which are difficult to identify 
and to quantify. Such subsidies typically include equity support (usually to absorb financial 
losses), favorable financing terms and favorable fiscal terms (e.g. exemptions), but can also 
                                                 
9 See CAMPBELL WHITE & BATHIA [1999], pp.83-84, and DAVIS, OSSOWSKI et alt. [2000], pp.9-15.  
  11cover privileges such as special concessions. Netting out public enterprises subsidies to the 
government is even more difficult, as public enterprise accounts are rarely available. Even 
if the analysis is restricted to direct subsidies only –which is very partial-, country data is 
still scarce, particularly in Francophone African countries. Data collected for 9 countries 
(Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia) reveal a sizable fall in direct subsidies between 1991 and 2000, as 
shown in Chart 10, with average direct subsidies moving from 1.4% GDP to virtually 0% 
between 1991 and 2000. Although the negative trend identified in the above countries is 
certainly plausible, the overall remaining level of subsidization after more than a decade of 
privatization is an open question mark. As a matter of illustration, calculation of the total 
net subsidies to public enterprises was carried out in the case of Uganda by the IMF
10 for 
the years 1993-1998. The results show that net subsidies to public enterprises have slightly 
decreased from 3.5% of GDP in 1993 to 2.3% of GDP in 1998 and that indirect subsidies 
accounted for more than 70% of total subsidies to public enterprises. These ratios of net 
subsidies to GDP (2.7% on average) are quite large compared to health and education 
expenditures which averaged 3.5% of GDP during the same period. It turns out that only 
eight enterprises account for 90% of total net subsidies, including Uganda Railway 
Corporation,  Uganda Commercial Bank, Uganda Electricity Board, Uganda Post and 
Telecommunications and National Water & Sewerage Corporation. Thus, despite the fact 
that more than one hundred companies were divested since 1991, it is hard to say that the 
net fiscal impact of privatization has been impressive, which offers another illustration of 
the illusion created by the number of privatization transactions. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that there will be a net positive fiscal impact in the much longer run, i.e. when 
large state-owned utilities companies come into private ownership and stop benefiting 
from indirect subsidies. 
 
  The impact of privatization on tax revenue has been mixed at the microeconomic level 
This conclusion must be qualified in many respects, as it is actually very difficult to isolate 
the effect of privatization on tax revenues from fundamental changes in the tax regime or 
exogenous factors affecting tax revenue collection (weather, war etc.). Intuitively, 
privatization may lead to higher tax revenues for the government. This reflects both 
increased profitability and efficiency at the level of the private firm responding to market 
incentives and the fact that public enterprises often benefited from weaker auditing and tax 
collection efforts. On the other hand, from the point of view of tax administration, tax 
collection may be easier in a system dominated by few large SOEs than with many smaller 
private firms which may prove more skillful at evading taxes
11. The existence of these two 
opposite effects has been quite clear in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the one end of the 
spectrum, JONES, JAMMAL & GOKKUR [1999] found in the case of Cote d’Ivoire that the 
increased profitability of privatized firms led to additional tax revenue, accounting for 41% 
of net government benefits. At the other end of the spectrum, Tanzania illustrates the case 
of a tax base moving away from a large, easy-to-tax public sector to a largely informal 
private sector. According to Table 1, roughly 50% of SOEs have been privatized. 
However, what Table 1 does not reveal is that the tax base has been eroding in the second 
half of the nineties, reflecting the fact that most private firms remained outside the tax net 
either because they operated in the informal sector or because they enjoyed various 
                                                 
10 IMF Staff Country Report  99/116, pp.43-51. 
11 DAVIS, OSSOWSKI et alt. [2000], p.17. 
  12exemptions
12. Interestingly, between 1996 and 2001, the bulk of tax exemptions was 
granted to private companies (40% of total exemptions) and not to remaining parastatals. 
Overall, it appears that the major changes in the structure of taxation and tax 
administration reforms aimed at increasing tax collection introduced during the 1990s have 
contributed significantly to the slight increase in tax revenue recorded in most Sub-Sahara 
African countries. Although this may be a bold conclusion at this stage, it would seem 
indeed that privatization has been less decisive than profound tax administration reform for 
revenue performance.  
 
These trends tend to suggest that it is perhaps an overstatement to present privatization as 
an obvious “fiscal opportunity”. Although the argument is theoretically valid in the long 
run, its amplitude is highly correlated with the level of pre-privatization subsidization and 
with the overall efficiency of the tax system in the short run. 
 
Chart 9. Countries where the average sale value exceeded 1% of  
Government revenue (1991-2001) 














Percentage of Government Revenue (%) 
Average sale salue
Average pivatization proceeds accruing to the budget
 
Notes:   Government revenues exclude grants and refer to average revenue over the period. 
•  Data on privatization proceeds accruing to the budget should be considered with caution as there   
were many classification and definition problems in the early 1990s. As a result, data tends to be 
biased towards the latter part of the time period considered (i.e. 1996-2001). 
•  Data is often biased by some key transactions: the copper & cobalt transactions of the late 1990s 
substantially inflate Zambia’s rating. If such transactions were to be removed, average sale value 
would amount to 7.7% of government revenues during the period under consideration. In the case of 
Cape Verde, divestment from public utilities (telecom, electricity and water) and banks transactions 
largely inflate the figure. The sale of Ashanti Goldfields has the same effect on Ghana’s rating. In the 
case of Senegal, the rating is also biased by the sale of SONATEL (Telecom) and SENELEC 
(electricity) in 1997. Finally, Mozambique’s rating is sensitive to the very low average of Government 
revenue (11.3% of GDP). 
 
Sources: World Bank Privatization Database, IMF Staff Country Reports, various years 
                                                 
12 See IMF, “Tanzania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix”, IMF Staff Report, January 2003, pp.5-15. 








































































Sample countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
Sources: IMF Staff Country Reports, various years 
 




















































Source: IMF Staff Country Report 99/116, Table 15 
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Box 1.  Looking for the best deal. The case of Zambia’s ZCCM copper mines 
 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) was Zambia’s largest commercial enterprise, 
generating more than 70% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and contributing about 10% 
of GDP in the early 1990s. The main shareholders of the company were the Zambian government 
(60% of the shares) and the South African conglomerate Anglo American (27% of the shares). 
Although ZCCM was the fifth largest copper producer in the world, it was in dire financial 
condition and suffered from a chronic lack of investment, Between 1992 and 1996, the government 
examined a number of options to privatize ZCCM and initiated talks with Anglo American, the 
latter being an essential partner as it also held preemptive rights to purchase any shares sold by the 
government once the government share fell below 50%. Even if Anglo American’s cooperation 
was perceived as essential for the success of any privatization proposal, there were also fears about 
the formidable influence Anglo could exert on the future of Zambia, were ZCCM to be entirely 
swallowed by Anglo. This concern was actually behind the 1994 Kienbaum report funded by the 
World Bank, which advised the unbundling of ZCCM assets
13. After two years of internal debate 
and another study commissioned by the Zambian government, the unbundling strategy was finally 
adopted. The Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA) took over responsibility for managing the ZCCM 
privatization and negotiations with interested investors started in 1997. Anglo American had all the 
way stated that the unbundling was not its preferred option, but it was willing to cooperate with 
government’s strategy. The first asset to go was the Luanshya Division to the RAMCOZ group for 
US$35 mn
14, but only one bid was received for the largest package of sets. The bid, which came 
from the Kafue Consortium representing US, UK and Canadian companies, offered US$150 mn in 
cash plus committed investment of US$400 mn. This fell short of  Zambia’s expectations. In the 
following months however, as the price of copper collapsed, partly because of the East-Asian 
crisis, the Kafue Consortium reduced its cash offer and demanded the inclusion of additional assets 
in the package. ZCCM operating losses were also mounting and the assets were deteriorating, 
lacking badly needed investment. Eventually, as ZPA became systematically bypassed by the 
Zambian government (who appointed the former CEO of ZCCM to lead the negotiations), 
discussions soured on book asset valuation and negotiations collapsed. By mid-1998, “Anglo-
American was the only suitable mining investor that continued to show lukewarm interest in 
ZCCM’s assets”
15, but it took almost one and half more year to form a consortium including the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the UK’s Commonwealth Development Corporation. 
The sale of what now constitutes KCM (the largest chunk of ZCCM) finally took place in March 
2000, for US$30 in cash and committed investment of US$200 mn for the Konkola Deep
16. Yet, in 
early 2002, Anglo American announced its intention to step out: accumulated losses since March 
2000 were estimated at US$108m, partly because of plummeting copper prices and because the 
cost of developing Konkola had more than trebled from US$300m to US$1bn. Zambia is now back 
to square one, looking for a brave enough strategic investor to take over vastly outdated assets in 
the midst of a depressed copper environment. 
 
The ZCCM story shows that the costs of delays in the privatization process turned the fiscal 
opportunity into a major financial disaster for the Zambian government. As part of the deal, the 
government had to assume ZCCM’s accumulated debts of about US$ 770 mn and had to grant 
generous tax incentives to investors. Ultimately, the drive for maximizing the transaction value has 
turned into a major financial and economic debacle. 
                                                 
13 CRAIG [2001], p.394. 
14 The outcome proved a disaster as the firm collapsed shortly after the deal with RAMCOZ being placed into 
receivership. More details about this particular transaction are given in section 3c. 
15 WORLD BANK [2002d], p.16. 
16 The last (smaller) package was sold to the Glencore International consortium for some US$20 mn in cash. 
  15b. Change in Enterprise Performance 
 
Assessing enterprise performance post-privatization is a very challenging task, both 
methodologically and statistically. This is usually done either by comparing pre and post 
enterprise performances, or by trying to work out a counterfactual scenario under a 
“reasonable” set of assumptions (“what would have happened in absence of 
privatization?”). Unfortunately, there are very few rigorous studies dealing with Sub-
Saharan Africa. For one thing, access to enterprises financial data is very limited and even 
when firms are willing to disclose information on post-privatization performance, there are 
often unable to provide pre-privatization data for comparison
17. This situation is 
aggravated by the fact that in most situations, there is no post-privatization monitoring. 
Last but not least, privatizations often do not take place in a vacuum, but are part of an 
evolving macroeconomic framework where liberalization policies can affect enterprise 
behavior and financial performance
18. External economic shocks such as a sharp reduction 
in commodity prices or more generally, a global economic downturn or boom, are also 
likely to affect enterprise performances, which makes the analysis very time sensitive. In 
such circumstances, assessing causality between privatization and enterprises performance 
is a difficult challenge.  
 
Available studies (BENNEL [1997], CAMPBELL-WHITE & BHATIA [1998] and PAULSON [1999]) rely 
mostly on anecdotal evidence and on mail questionnaires to report some results on the 
ground, but no attempt has been made to date to measure financial and operating 
performance of newly privatized firms in Africa. BOUBAKRI & COSSET [1999] carried out a 
first analysis of privatized firms’ performance in Africa, but their sample is limited to 16 
enterprises spread out between Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Their 
results suggest a weak improvement in the profitability of newly privatized firms, and 
indicate that efficiency as well as output measured by real sales decreased slightly, while 
capital expenditure rose significantly in the post-privatization period. The limited sample, 
as well as the over-representation of firms from Morocco and Tunisia (65% of the sample) 
make it impossible to draw any conclusion from such results for Sub-Saharan Africa.   
However, three general findings can be derived from the existing country studies over the 
1991-2002 period: 
 
  Privatization results have generally been positive in the manufacturing, industrial and 
service sectors.  
  Firm turnover and profitability have generally increased immediately following 
privatization –which is to be expected- but the evidence is mixed regarding the 
sustainability of the initial post-privatization upswing.  
  Notwithstanding measurement problems, private investment has generally increased 
following privatization relative to public investment.  
 
These average results hide large performance variation across sectors and countries, which 
are associated with considerable variation in the country business environments. Although 
the evidence is still patchy, some country examples are provided in Box 2. From a business 
                                                 
17 CAMPBELL WHITE & BATHIA [1998], p.85. 
18 An obvious example is the devaluation of the CFA Franc, in January 1994, which put tremendous financial 
pressure on those firms dependent on imports. 
  16performance point of view, an important message is that privatization appears to have been 
a relatively successful “damage control exercise”. Against this background, the biggest 
question mark has to do with the sustainability of privatized firms over time. To some 
extent, the private investment picture in most countries also signal a more or less bell-
shape trend (see Chart 12), which may indicate that the volume of private investment so far 
realized does not suffice to fulfill the objective of using privatization as a catalyst to 
private sector activity. This is hardly surprising given the fact that most countries have 
only recently started to divest from the larger infrastructure firms and other “strategic” 
sectors. 
 
More fundamentally, the existence of a small number of outright failures and scandals has 
definitely affected the general public’s perception of the economic impact of privatization. 
For instance, even if the overall privatization program of Zambia is often described as a 
model case and a “success”
19, the most of important sector of the economy (copper) has 
gone through a very messy privatization process involving scandals and eventually the 





























Source: IMF Staff Country Papers, various years 
                                                 
19 See CAMPBELL-WHITE & BATHIA [1998], pp.111-113. 
20 See Box 1. 
21 Private sector definition is not uniform across Sub-Saharan Africa and SOE investment is often reported as  
“private investment”.  As a result, private investment figures are notoriously inflated in some countries, 
which makes it very difficult to identify reliable trends over time. In Chart 12, 24 countries were used but 
only 10 of them exclude SOEs in private investment figures.   
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Box  2. Enterprise performance post-privatization. Some country evidence 
 
In  Cote d’Ivoire, an impact study applied to 81 privatizations (JONES,  JAMMAL  &  GOKGUR 
[1999]), covering not just infrastructure firms but a range of firms already operating in competitive 
markets (in agriculture, agro-industries, tradable and non-tradable sectors) concluded that firms 
performed better after privatization and that they performed better than they would have had they 
remained under public ownership. The study also found that the set of transactions as a whole 
contributed positively to economic welfare, with annual net welfare benefits equivalent to about 
25% of pre-divestiture sales. These results stemmed from a number of effects, including increases 
in output, investment, labor productivity, and intermediate-input productivity.  Available studies do 
not point to major failures in the privatization program, but a number of questions remain with 
respect to competition (cocoa sector) and regulation (electricity, telecommunications), as there are 
claims that public monopolies were simply replaced by private monopolies. 
 
In  Mozambique, a 1996 impact study over 91 firms across the country found that following 
privatization, most of the enterprises in the sample could be characterized as showing an overall 
improvement in their performance based on increases in sales, production levels, number of 
employees and salaries paid. Another study covering 152 firms in the manufacturing sector 
between 1992 and 1998 found similar results in terms of labor productivity, investment and sales 
growth, although new entrants seemed to be better than privatized firms in terms of sales growth, 
job creation and contribution to investment
22.  A flagship of the privatization program is that of 
Cervejas de Moçambique (CDM), a brewery company created following the privatization of the 
three local breweries in 1995. Production tripled between 1995 and 1998. One of the major failures 
of the program is certainly that of the privatization of Banco Commercial de Moçambique in 1996, 
which was completed despite major concerns about the only bidder, a Portuguese consortium. Soon 
after, the bank was in trouble because of fraud, large loans to connected parties and problems with 
the pre-privatization portfolio resulting from poor regulations and lax supervision and political 
pressure to lend to “well connected” parties, and had to be recapitalized in 2001.  
 
In  Tanzania, a study by an independent auditing form for the Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission (PSRC) compared indicators before and after privatization, based on the results of a 
survey at the end of 1998. The study found that on average, companies showed an increase in 
productivity and investment post-privatization
23. Another study, covering 18 newly privatized firms 
in various manufacturing, services and industrial sectors, revealed mixed profit performance in the 
first years following privatization
24. In many instances, amounts and status of parastatal debt 










                                                 
22 See BIGGS, et alt. [1999], pp.11-21. 
23 “Tanzania: Selected Issues & Statistical Appendix”, IMF Country Report 03/2, January 2003, pp.96-97. 
24 DUE, TEMU & TEMU [2000]. 
  18Box 2. Enterprise performance post-privatization. Some country evidence (continued) 
 
In Zambia, a 2001 survey of 56 privatized firms (including the largest 20 privatized enterprises 
and a sample of smaller companies) found that the turnover of most enterprises increased in the 
two years immediately following privatization, and that firms were generally slightly better off for 
years after privatization despite a depressed business environment
25. However, for many of the 
typically smaller and local market oriented enterprises, the initial post privatization upswing in 
turnover has not been sustained. The study concludes that the program achieved an important 
measure of “damage control” since only 19 firms (out of 254) had failed since privatization Among 
the flagships of the privatization program are the cases of Zambia Coffee and Zambia Brewery, 
which have both expanded production and investment massively since privatization. But the 
program’s darkest spot is certainly that of the Copper Mining Company ZCCM, which was finally 
privatized in 2000 after 5 years of procrastination. The debacle began with the collapse of 
RAMCOZ  in 1999 including retrenchment scandals, and followed with the pulling out of Anglo-
American from ZCCM in 2002. These problems seriously tarnished the privatization picture given 
the importance of the copper sector in Zambia. 
 
In Ghana, partial studies show a general growth in the divested companies, particularly those in 
the mining, manufacturing and services sector between 1992 and 1998
26. In the mining sector for 
instance, the profit ratio to sales increased by 950%. A 1999 survey of 47 newly privatized firms 
showed that privatization also helped increase the volume of investment in the divested sectors 
through the introduction of new equipment and major rehabilitation of production plants which 
would not otherwise have taken place. Pooled data from 32 firms over the 1986-1995 period show 
that the financial performance of private firms both in terms of return on assets and return on sales 
was stronger than in state-owned enterprises, although other factors also played a role in explaining 
financial performance
27. Among the flagship cases is the privatization of Ashanti Goldfields 
Company (AGC), which was able to tap into international capital markets to fund investment in 
new equipment and technology following state divestiture. As a result, gold production rose 
substantially while production costs declined over time. Other sectors, such as the “strategic” oil 
sector, have been much more difficult to deal with, but the most striking failure of the program is 
the privatization of Ghana Telecom (GT) in 1997, sold to Malaysia Telekom. Ghana was among 
the first African markets to see the partial privatization of a state-owned fixed carrier and the 
introduction of competition in the basic services market in 1997. Although GT’s financial 
performance has improved since its privatization, the company failed to meet cumulative network 
deployment targets, overall quality of service has remained low, with Ghana remaining one of the 
few African markets with more fixed than mobile users. This failure is first and foremost that of a 
disorganized market framework that led to the licensing of multiple operators using various 
technology standards, confusing Telecom sector policy, and ineffectual regulatory oversight. It was 




                                                 
25 WORLD BANK [2002d]   
26 See APPIAH-KUPI [2001] and OPOKU [1999]. 
27 BAVOn [1998], pp.53-72. 
28 Pyramid Research, 26 February 2002. 
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Box 2. Enterprise performance post-privatization. Some country evidence (ctd) 
 
 
In  Nigeria, a survey over 34 firms conducted by the Nigerian government revealed that the 
performance of the enterprises improved markedly compared to their status before privatization
29. 
For instance, the average turnover of the companies increased by 221%. A further assessment of 
profitability of these enterprises using return on investment showed positive post privatization 
growth for most companies as 19 or 55.9 percent of the companies recorded more earnings after 
privatization from funds invested. A look at the investment turnover also revealed that most of the 
companies (62%) experienced increases in the ratio of turnover to capital employed. 
 
 
In Sénégal, a WORLD BANK [1995] study concluded that the collective performance of privatized 
firms deteriorated after privatization in terms of net operating surplus and profits before taxes, real 
variable costs and total factor productivity. In the second half of the 1990s, the privatization of its 
major utilities (telecom and water in 1996, electricity in 1999) have been more positive in terms of 
profitability at the firm level, but the cases of water and electricity have not yielded the expected 
results in terms of performance, access and prices. 
 
 
In  Uganda, firm surveys indicate that privatization has led to increased industrial capacity 
utilization and profitability. Capacity utilization of the privatized firms has increased by 11% 
according to some reports, with the more spectacular growth recorded in the beverage industries. 
NGO reports also indicate that privatization has led to increased supply of quality good and 
services to the market, especially essential commodities (sugar, salt, soap), which prior to 
privatization were in short supply
30. Among the flagship cases is the opening up of the 
Telecommunication sector in 1998 when a second network license was won by Mobile Telephone 
Networks of South Africa (MTN). At the other side of the spectrum is the case of the Uganda 
Commercial Bank  in 1997, which had to be placed under government management again two 
years after its privatization owing to a huge governance scandal (see Box 4). 
 
 
In some other countries, evidence about post-privatization performance is patchier, which reflects 
the fact that some important transactions took place very recently. In Cameroon for instance, 
privatization only gained momentum after 1998, when the focus shifted to large agro-industrial and 
transportation enterprises and the public utilities. Even so, only a very limited number of deals 
were effectively finalized (among which, the sale of the electricity company SONEL in 2001) and 
post-privatization performance assessment is still in its infancy. Anecdotal evidence reveal 
significant problems with electricity supply since privatization, but no detailed study exists to date 
The only sector subject to monitoring is the financial sector, following its restructuring from 1996 
to 1998. All commercial banks in Cameroon have been privatized or liquidated, show satisfactory 




                                                 
29 Abuja Mirror, January 19-25, 2000. See also International Privatization Review 2001, pp.116-117. 
30 SAPRI [2001]. 
  20c. Impact on Employment 
 
One of the most common fears associated with privatization worldwide is certainly job 
destruction. Given the size of the public sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, similar fears have 
and continue to be nurtured. Here again, data is scarce and incomplete, and exhibits large 
variation across sectors and countries. Available studies and information point to the 
following observations:  
 
  Employment has been adversely affected mainly in the period leading up to 
privatization or in case of liquidation 
  Even if the work force of privatized/liquidated firms diminished in relative terms, there 
has not been massive layoffs in absolute terms. In some countries, retrenchment packages 
have become a serious issue, however.  
  Although the general trend is a continuous decline in employment levels over time, there 
are a few cases where employment increased in the years following privatization, 
reflecting good performance and new business opportunities 
 
The first observation reflects the expected pre-sale “cleaning up” of many parastatals, 
where overstaffing and redundant labor force was a major issue. 
The second observation reflects the fact that first and foremost, government have 
deliberately delayed privatizing enterprises where a high social cost could be 
expected
31, which also explains why privatizations have targeted by and large small and 
medium-sized SOEs. In Zambia, employment of the privatized non-mining sector declined 
by about 30% between 1992 and 2001, and by about 20% in the mining sector. 
Interestingly, although the layoffs were largely concentrated in the earlier years, 
employment declined on a continuous basis until 2001. In Tanzania, partial data obtained 
from a sample of privatized enterprises indicated that employment declined by 30-50%
32, 
with sizable firm variation. In Benin, overall employment in the companies declined by 
36% between 1990 and 1996.  In Mozambique, the decline in employment has been fairly 
small, at least in the manufacturing sector, i.e. about 0.8% between 1992 and 1997. These 
partial results are more anecdotal than anything else, as no systematic study has been 
conducted on the employment trend of privatized companies over a sustained period of 
time. As for firm performance, it is perhaps best to describe the employment effects in 
terms of “damage control” for the time being. 
  
Workers and trade unions opposition to privatization has been a major factor behind the 
delay of the privatization process in a number of countries, and more particularly in Ghana, 
Malawi and Tanzania in the mid-1990s. This has resulted in harsh negotiations about 
retrenchment benefits, which have not only deterred potential investors but also exhausted 
a sizable portion of privatization receipts in a number of cases. In some countries (e.g. 
Benin, Mozambique, Zambia), employment guarantees have been used as bidding 
conditions, with various degrees of success. The best-known failure in imposing 
employment guarantees is the case of the Luanshya and Baluba copper mines in Zambia. 
Although it was assessed in 1998 that up to 3000 workers would become redundant under 
any reasonable business plan, the private company RAMCOZ agreed to take over the 
                                                 
31 CAMPBELL WHITE & BATHIA [1998], p.95. 
32 DUE, TEMU & TEMU [2000]. 
  21mines and not to dismiss any of the 7000 workers. Shortly after the deal, RAMCOZ laid 
off 3000 workers and failed to make termination payments. When the company went out of 
business in 1999, the remaining 4000 workers joined the unemployed. Eventually, the 
Zambian government had to pay partial compensation to the workers, but the case is still 
not finalized as of mid-2003.  
Another example of the retrenchment issue is the management contract for the electricity 
utility in Tanzania, TANESCO, in May 2002. In the context of an ad hoc system of widely 
varying retrenchment payments, TANESCO workers prevented the members of the new 
management team from entering their offices, pending an agreement on a generous 
retrenchment package with the government that would cost more than 1% of GDP. 
Although the new management team eventually took over the company, no agreement 
between the government and the workers has been reached to date
33. 
 
The third observation is perhaps the most encouraging, since it suggests that after the 
initial shock on employment as a result of privatization, some firms were able to expand. 
In Ghana for instance, employment in divested enterprises went up by 59%, and 
enterprises such as Golden Tulip Hotel, Ghana Agro-Food Company or Tema Steel 
Company have all achieved employment increase rates beyond 100%
34. In Cote d’Ivoire, 
employment in privatized firms increased by an average of 3.9% per year after 
privatization while falling by almost 2% per year prior to privatization according to a 1999 
study of 81 privatizations
35. In Burkina Faso, employment in privatized firms has also 
marginally increased following privatization between 1993 and 1999. Such examples 
remain the exception rather than the rule, although the general trend is a continuous albeit 
less pronounced decline in employment over time. 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that there are very limited information available about 
employment benefits, making it extremely difficult to assess post-privatization evolution of 
wages and salaries at this stage.  
 
One very general conclusion can be drawn from this limited discussion: the impact of 
privatization on employment has been by and large postponed in most countries, as 
most of the overstaffed SOEs remains to be privatized. The ongoing privatization of large 
SOEs, mainly public utilities, may change the picture in the near future. As a result, despite 
the fact that the decline in employment may appear to be high in some privatized firms in 
percentage terms, absolute numbers of retrenched personnel remain fairly low. One 
possible exception to this conclusion is Zambia, where several thousands of jobs have been 
lost in the mining debacle as well as in the privatization of public transportation services.  
 
 
d. Impact on FDI and Local Capital Markets 
 
Privatization programs have attracted foreign direct investment in most countries, 
particularly in connection with some large transactions such as the Ashanti gold mine in 
                                                 
33 IMF, “Tanzania: Selected Issues & Statistical Appendix”, IMF Staff Country Report 03/2, January 2003, 
p.98. 
34 APPIAH-KUBI [2001], p.217. 
35 JONES, JAMMAL & GOKGUR [1999], p. VII-8. 
  22Ghana or the ZCCM copper mines in Zambia. However, privatization-related FDI in Africa 
has remained fairly small by international standard: during the first half of the 1990s, 
privatization-related flows represented a mere 5% of total FDI on average, versus 43% in 
Eastern and Central Europe and 15% in Latin America
36. With the exception of 1997 and 
1998 when important services companies (e.g. Telecom Cote d’Ivoire, SONATEL in 
Senegal) were privatized, the situation is likely to be only marginally better in the second 
half of the 1990s. Although data on privatization-related FDI is scarce, it can be seen from 
Chart 13a below that net FDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa were 50% higher in the second 
half of the 1990s although the total transaction value was 30% higher on average than 
during the first half of the 1990s. Even when South Africa and Angola are removed from 
the sample, which together attract 65% of total FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, the picture does 
no fundamentally change (Chart 13b). Among the reasons behind the limited role of FDIs 
in the privatization process already identified by earlier studies, the most important seems 
to be the lack of opportunities for foreign investors. As noted earlier, in most countries, the 
bulk of divested firms consisted of small and medium sized enterprises, with few “big 
tickets” beyond the mining sector and former public utilities.  
 
Chart 13. Net Foreign Direct Investment  
and Privatization Transaction Values (US$mn) 
 














































































































Source: Global Development Finance 2003 
 
What about capital market development? Privatization and capital markets are 
interdependent, as stock exchanges can be used to mobilize domestic and foreign capital 
for privatization while the off-loading of SOE’s shares can boost local stock exchanges. 
With privatization, market capitalization is expected to increase, and so is the volume and 
value of stocks traded. Given the very low development of financial markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa (except in South Africa and to a lesser extend in Zimbabwe), how have 
stock markets and privatization programs been connected? Evidence to date point to two 
general conclusions:  
 
  Stock markets have played a limited role in privatization transactions despite some 
showcase transactions  
  Some privatizations have stimulated embryonic stock market activity in the short run 
 
                                                 
36 CAMPBELL-WHITE & BATHIA [1998], p.100. 
  23The first finding is not really a surprise, as it reflects the embryonic state of financial 
markets in many African countries. There are about 15 stock exchanges in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
37, the bulk of them being very small both in terms of GDP share and turnover.  In 
1998, the government of Tanzania sold 26% of the shares of Tanzania Breweries Ltd 
through the newly established Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange. This was the only 
privatization carried out entirely through the stock market. The market remains very small, 
however, with only 4 companies listed. In Ghana, a number of state-owned enterprises, 
including all the banks, were sold through public share offers on the stock exchange. 
Interestingly enough, some large companies such as Ghana Telecom and Ghana Oil 
Company have not been allowed to be privatized on the stock market. Capitalization of 
five former SOEs alone accounted for 75% of total stock exchange capitalization in 1998. 
In Cote d’Ivoire, the privatization program had a substantial impact on the growth of the 
Abidjan Stock Exchange (BVA): privatized companies have constituted the main source of 
new additions to the BVA since 1993.  The regional stock market (Bourse Régionale des 
Valeurs Mobilières), which replaced the BVA in 1998, also played an important role in 
allowing Senegal’s privatized telecom company SONATEL to have access to finance, but 
still lacks depth and liquidity, as only an handful of shares are truly dynamic. The second 
finding reflects the fact that some key privatization transactions have indeed boosted the 
otherwise non-existent stock-market activities for a limited period of time, but as can be 
seen from Table 5, the effect on market capitalization is especially manifest for the 1990-
1995 period but less for the 1996-2000 period, especially in terms of value traded.  
 
 




              $ millions                 % GDP 
Value 
traded 







1990  1995  2002  1990  2001  1990  2001  1990  2002  1990  1995  2002 
Cote 
d’Ivoire  549 428 1328  5.1  11.2  0.2  0.1  3.4  0.7  23  30  38 
Ghana  76 2005  740  1.2  10.1  …  0.2  0.0  2.5  13  17  24 
Kenya  453 1925  1423  5.3  9.2  0.1  0.4  2.2  3.8  54  56  57 
Nigeria  1372 1350 5740  4.8  11.3  0.0  1.2  0.9  10.6  131  182  195 
South 
Africa  137540 232062 187622  122.8  78.0  7.3  61.5  ..  78.9  732  626  450 
Tanzania  .. 10.5(b)  398  ..  4.3  ..  0.1    1.9    1 (b)  4 
Zambia  .. 442  217  ..  6.0  ..  1.3  ..  22.5  ..  10  9 
Zimbabwe  2395 1969 15632  27.3  88.0  0.6  16.9  2.9  19.2  57  64  76 
 (a) Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization 
 (b) 1998 value, i.e. at the opening of the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange 






                                                 
37 At the local level: Botswana, Cameroon (not yet effective), Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At 
the regional level: Cote d’Ivoire (UEMOA) and Gabon (CEMAC, in preparation). 
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e. Impact on Ownership  
 
The issue of local versus foreign participation in privatization deals is highly political in 
many countries as it is linked both to the general public’s acceptance of privatization 
policies and to transparency and governance issues. In several countries, business groups 
have criticized the prominent role of foreign companies in the privatization and denounced 
“economic recolonization”
38. In fact, nationality issues have become an extremely hot 
political issue especially in Eastern and Southern Africa countries
39, in contrast to West 
Africa where the debate has been less emotional. Broadening local participation has 
sometimes been a decisive element in certain transactions, but it has never been an explicit 
strategy in Sub-Saharan African countries. In fact, several privatization deals in Eastern 
Africa involved sales of investments in companies with preemptive rights of existing 
shareholders or sales on non-competitive terms
40, which seems to be in contradiction with 
the desire to broaden ownership.  One obvious reason behind the absence of a clear 
strategy regarding the broadening of ownership is the very limited access of domestic 
investors to finance. Another is the lack of management expertise in sensitive sectors. As 
stated before, there have been some attempts to deal with the ownership question in the 
context of a number of transactions: in Kenya, when KLM bought 26% of the shares of 
Kenya Airways in 1996, shares were also listed on the London and Nairobi Stock 
exchanges, with both offerings oversubscribed. Kenyan investors acquired 34% of the 
shares, international investors took 14%, the airline employees enrolled in a special 
program to purchase 3% while the government of Kenya retained 23%. It is estimated that 
as many as 110’000 different shareholders participated in the domestic offering
41. Other 
examples include Uganda, with the ownership scheme involving farmers of the Uganda 
Tea Growers’ Corporation (UTGC) and Zambia’s Privatization Trust Fund established in 
1994 as a vehicle for selling public minority shareholdings once the majority of shares 
have been sold by the Zambia Privatization Agency to core private investors. With this 
caveat in mind, the following observations can be made about the impact of privatization 
on ownership:  
 
   Local entrepreneurs have bought the vast majority of small and medium sized SOEs 
  Large SOEs in the “strategic” sectors (e.g. mining, public utilities) have almost 
invariably been taken over by foreign investors. As a rule, the larger the transaction value, 
the higher the involvement of foreign investors
42 
  Whenever nationals purchase a public enterprise, they are more likely to buy it on 





                                                 
38 HARSCH [2000], p.8 
39 See TANGRI [1999], pp.54-61. 
40 Kenya offers a compelling case in this respect with 51% of transactions were in the form of preemptive 
rights sales between 1991 and 2001. 
41 MAKONNEN [1999], pp16-17. 
42 See CRAIG [2002], p.13.  
43 See BENNELL [1997], op.cit. p.1797;  “Ghana: Selected issues”, IMF Country Report Nr.2, January 2000, 
p.90. 
  25f. Regulation and Competition  
 
Market structure, competition and regulation frameworks clearly matter in the privatization 
process. In competitive sectors, “competition” is not necessarily a trivial outcome 
depending on the original market structure and the sequencing of reforms, and requires a 
proper framework. In non-competitive sectors, such as some infrastructure monopolies like 
water distribution or power distribution, enterprise privatization is tantamount to 
privatizing the sector in which is operates. Adequate regulation is therefore crucial for the 
proper functioning of the sector. In all cases, the conventional wisdom is that competition 
and regulation should be dealt with before any final decisions are taken on the ownership 
question
44. The main argument here is that privatizing first and regulating later does not 
constitute a first-best option from an economic standpoint, and instead tends to strengthen 
vested interests, complicates subsequent regulations, leads to “regulation capture” and may 
seriously curb effective competition. In the telecom sector for instance, empirical research 
indicates that competition gains are higher in countries where regulation has been 
addressed prior to the introduction of competition
45. SHIRLEY et al.. [2002b] also insists on 
the “reputation advantage” of setting up the regulator beforehand. 
 
One would a priori think that regulatory and competition issues are even more decisive for 
the post-privatization business environment in Sub-Saharan African economies, where 
most sectors have generally been either oligopolistic or monopolistic, and operated with 
information asymmetries and poor institutional frameworks. With widespread private 
participation in public utilities and infrastructures across the region (as shown in Table 6), 
how have these issues been dealt with in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available evidence point to 
two general findings.  
 
  In the first half of the 1990s, neither the regulatory framework nor the competition 
framework was developed as an integral part of the reform  
 
  In the second half of the 1990s, when large utilities were privatized in some countries, 
although regulatory frameworks were put in place, enforcement problems have limited the 
effectiveness of both regulation and competition in several countries. 
 
 The first conclusion, which is very blunt, was reached unambiguously by CAMPBELL-WHITE 
& BATHIA [1998] (p.48), and indicates that the issues of competition and regulation have 
almost systematically come as a painful afterthought. In most countries, privatization was 
pushed ahead before a sound regulatory framework was in place, which both prejudiced 
the process of privatization itself and laid it open to the charge of creating private 
monopolies which would exploit the consumer. The very same argument holds for 
competition, as it turns out that there are no anti-trust legislation in most African countries, 
which favor cartel arrangements and abuse of economic position. In Ghana for instance, it 
appears that the privatization program focused on economic considerations but paid little 
attention to establishing credible regulatory institutions. Apart from a free trade policy, the 
government had no policy on either competition or regulation
46, and the guidelines on 
                                                 
44 GUISLAIN [1997], p.212. 
45 WALLSTEN [2002]. See also FINK, MATTOO & RATHINDRAN [200] for further analysis of sequencing. 
46 See APPIAH-KUBI [2001], p.223. 
  26privatization failed to address the issue of regulating private sector commercial activities 
and pricing decisions of privatized firms enjoying operating in infrastructures. It was only 
after a public outcry following substantial price hikes by former public utilities in 1998 
that the Public Utilities Commission was formally constituted
47. This has naturally driven 
many enterprises to look to securing their monopoly power. The case of the electricity 
sector in Cote d’Ivoire, which also offers some perspectives on the risks of regulatory 
capture, is reviewed in detail in Box 3.  
 
The second conclusion mentioned above is more serious in scope as it highlights the 
institutional deficiencies and limitations prevailing in most African countries with regard 
to the creation of credible regulatory agencies and the enforcement of contracts and the 
rule of law in general. Indeed, recent experiences with utility privatization between 1997 
and 2002 in Sub-Saharan Africa show that more attention has been paid to regulation and 
competition frameworks, but implementation remains a very serious problem in most 
cases. Under the auspices of the World Bank, technical assistance and advice has been 
given to Governments in the context of recent privatizations. For instance, during the 
privatization of Gabon’s Société d'Energie et d'Eau du Gabon (water sector),  technical 
assistance was aimed at developing an independent regulatory authority as the capacity of 
the Gabonese government to regulate was very limited. As the relations between the 
concessionaire and the authorities over the next 20 years (the duration of the contract) were  
described in great detailed in the transaction documents, efforts were geared towards 
pining down the rules of the game as much as possible. The concession contract specified 
in detail all the respective obligations of concessionaire and conceding authority, the 
penalties, the accounting rules, the rules for tariff review, mechanisms for arbitration, and 
so on.  
 
Of course, the move towards detailed regulations is a double-edged sword. First of all, the 
greater the contract specificity, the greater the likelihood of opportunistic negotiations, as 
parties may tempted to take advantage of any subsequent change in conditions to reopen 
contracts and embark on endless renegotiation. Second and more fundamentally, in 
practice, the effectiveness of any competition or regulation framework is highly dependent 
on how contracts are defined and enforced, and on the functioning of the judiciary. 
Unfortunately, the lack of de facto independence of regulatory authorities and of the 
judiciary often goes hand in hand. Box 3 presents some illustrations of this problem in the 
cases of Ghana  (Telecom sector) and Guinea (water sector), while providing a more 
positive story for Uganda (Telecom sector). Although the regulation issue is naturally 
receiving a lot of attention in the context of utilities and infrastructure, it is also important 
in other (more competitive) sectors like transportation as illustrated by the case of 
Tanzania: in Dar es Salaam for instance, after fifteen years of chronic transport shortages, 
private buses have now managed to meet demand following privatization. Yet, there is no 
effective control of entry into the market of the intra-regional and inter-regional 
transportation sector
48. It now appears that the market is over-supplied as a result of the 
lack of state control over conditions of entry and regulations of standards within the 
market. Competition between a very large number of private operators “has manifested 
                                                 
47 idem.  
48 IMF, “Tanzania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix”, IMF Staff Country Report 03/2, January 2003, 
p.93. 
  27itself in speeding, overloading of vehicles, and reluctance to comply with policy directives 
on concessionary tariffs”
49. A lack of effective regulation on working conditions allows 
bus owners to take advantage of the abundant supply of labor to protect their own margins 
at the cost of their workers and passengers. 
 
To conclude, it is fairly obvious that effective competition and regulation remain the most 
daunting challenge in all countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South 
Africa. It is not a new problem, it is a persistent one which deserves more attention at the 
policy level, as it has implications on many post-privatization aspects, including that of the 
social outcome of privatization.   
                                                 
49 RIZZO [2002], pp.153-154. 
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50  Telecom  Water & 
Sanitation 
Benin -  -  - 
Botswana -      - 
Burkina Faso  -  -      
Burundi -      - 
Cameroon -      - 
Cape Verde                
Central African Republic  -           
Chad -           
Congo                
Cote d’Ivoire                
Dem. Rep. of the Congo  -      - 
Gabon      -      
Gambia -  -  - 
Ghana           - 
Guinea                
Guinea Bissau           - 
Kenya           - 
Lesotho -      - 
Madagascar -      - 
Malawi -      - 
Mali      -      
Mauritania -      - 
Mauritius           - 
Mozambique -           
Namibia -      - 
Nigeria -      - 
Niger                
Rwanda -      - 
Sao Tome & Principe           - 
Senegal                
South Africa                
Sudan -      - 
Swaziland -      - 
Tanzania           - 
Togo -  -  - 
Uganda -           
Zambia            - 
Zimbabwe           - 
 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database, African Privatization Database,  
HALL, BAYLISS & LOBINA [2002]. 
                                                 
50  Defined to include electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and natural gas transmission and distribution 
(but not extraction or processing). 
  29Box 3. Competition and Regulation. Some Country Evidence 
 
The telecom sector in Ghana is a textbook case of failed liberalization due to a very weak 
institutional setting and provides interesting lessons on the impact of weak regulation on 
competition.  
 
Ghana was among the first African countries to see partial privatization of a state-owned fixed 
carrier and introduce competition in the basic services market. In December 1996 it privatized its 
incumbent firm, Ghana Telecom (GT), and sold a license to another investor to build a competing 
network in 1997 (Westel). Three mobile operators began their operations between 1992 and 1996. 
So on paper, stiff competition was injected in the telecom sector, with 2 fixed-line carriers and 
three mobile operators. However, although the reforms produced a rapid growth in fixed lines, 
expansion was strictly limited to Accra, targets were not met and Ghana remained one of the few 
markets in Africa with more fixed than mobile users. Worse, competition never worked: GT 
maintained a market share of at least 99% until 2002, while Westel never got off the ground: after 
three years of operations, Westel only had about 2600 subscribers due to very serious 
interconnectivity problems with GT. The mobile market also suffered from interconnectivity 
problems and proved very chaotic, as mobile operators using various technology standards were 
allowed to offer services under loosely defined “authorizations” rather than formal licenses with 
well defined obligations. What lies behind Ghana’s telecom mayhem is a weak regulatory 
framework, subject to political influence and an inability to enforce decisions. Interestingly, 
regulation was an integral part of the reform, and the December 1996 Act creating the National 
Communications Authority (NCA) gave the regulator considerable authority including 
responsibilities for granting licenses, setting standards, providing tariff rules and regulating the use 
of frequencies. NCA was also empowered to require operators to permit interconnections (by 
imposing default agreements if necessary). However, the regulations prepared to accompany the 
act have never been passed by Parliament. In addition, the Act failed to safeguard the NCA’s 
independence from political influence, as the President appointed all members of its board, and the 
NCA remained under the control of the Minister of Communications. In fact, the NCA has never 
functioned as envisioned in the Act, had no board of directors between 1997 and 2000, was led by 
interim managements, was mostly staffed by retired professionals from GT
51, and had neither 
information nor power to act as a neutral regulator.   
 
This weak environment has seriously hampered competition, as GT had every incentive to make 
interconnection difficult for all potential competitors that needed access to its customers. Worse, 
the amount of public information available about GT diminished drastically after privatization 
(despite the fact that GT is still 70% public owned), leaving it virtually free from public scrutiny.   
 
In February 2002, the Ghanaian government abrogated its management contract with Telecom 
Malaysia and signed a three-year similar contract with Norway’s Telenor. Although the change of 
strategic investor may signal a new start for the sector, the need to address the vastly inadequate 








                                                 
51 SHIRLEY et alt. [2002b], pp.22-24.  
Box 3. Competition and Regulation. Some Country Evidence (continued) 
 
The telecom sector in Uganda, offers an interesting example of liberalization in a setting similar to 
Ghana’s, but where the institutional framework supported rather than hampered competition. 
Uganda, like Ghana, allowed competition in basic services by selling a second network license in 
1998 while struggling with the privatization of its incumbent operator, Uganda 
Telecommunications (UTL), which eventually was divested in June 2000 on the fourth 
privatization attempt. Prior to 1997, the authorities had issued a limited cellular license in 1994 to 
Celtel, a private GSM service operator backed by Vodafone Airtouch Group. By and large, the 
sector was largely unregulated. 
 
The second network license was won by Mobile Telephone Networks of South Africa (MTN) in 
April 1998 through an open bidding process. The privatization of UTL was also initiated in 1998, 
but Parliament, concerned with corrupt practices in other transactions, suspended all privatization 
activity. Despite the fact that the UTL transaction was explicitly exempt from this ban, the process 
dragged on until 2000, when 51% of the shares were sold to a multinational consortium. Both 
MTN’s entry and UTL’s privatization have boosted competition: shortly before UTL privatization, 
MTN’s market share was close to 60%, while UTL’s share had dropped to 25% and Celtel’s share 
was around 12%. Connected customers grew by 265% in about two and half years and MTN 
overshot all its contractual expansion targets. With the privatization of UTL, competition moved to 
the mobile front,  and the number of wireless subscribers surged while tariffs declined further.  
 
One important dimension of this success is the demonstration effect of the institutional framework: 
the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) was created in 1997 and had the responsibility of 
granting licenses, setting standards, providing tariff rules, regulating the use of frequencies. NCA 
was also empowered to require operators to permit interconnections (by imposing default 
agreements if necessary). As in Ghana, UCC was not fully independent of the Ministry of 
Communications, yet the Government has not intervened to date in the regulatory process, 
reflecting its credibility concern vis-à-vis private investors. One additional factor which may have 
paradoxically helped is the fact that the telecom sector was not considered as overly “strategic” by 
the Government, which may also explain the lack of political interference in the regulatory process. 
And although interconnection issues have given rise to tensions, competition has not been 
hindered. The regulator has illustrated a growing track record of fairness and transparent methods 
of work as well as a growing tradition of non-interference from government
52, which has favored 
competition. 
  
Interestingly, the sale of UTL proved to be more valuable and viable into a competitive market than 
before competition was in place, and contrary to what happened in other countries, delaying a sale 
until the regulatory body was up and running provided important comfort to bidders. The delay 
also helped establish competition in Uganda, in sharp contrast to the case of Ghana. This example 
strongly suggests that sequencing in competition and regulation is an important issue in order to 







                                                 
52 See SHIRLEY et alt. [2002a], pp.33-48. 
  31Box 3. Competition and Regulation. Some Country Evidence (continued) 
 
In  Cote d’Ivoire, the electricity sector is a typical example of the problems associated with 
privatizing the utility first and then gradually refining the regulatory structure as the need arises.  
 
By 1990, financial mismanagement had nearly bankrupted EECI –the electricity company. Despite 
very high electricity tariffs, it faced increasing liquidity problems and risked insolvency. This 
prompted President Houphouët Boigny to call up the French businessman Bouygues and ask him to 
make a bid. An ad-hoc Ministerial committee was set up to negotiate the deal bilaterally with the 
Bouygues group and Electricité de France (EdF). After 5 months of negotiations, a 15 year 
concession was given to the new Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Energie (CIE) to manage for a fee the 
generation, transmission, distribution, import and export of electricity. Responsibility for 
investment remained in the hands of the former public concession holder, EECI, which also 
oversaw the application of the concession. CIE is managed by SAUR (of the Bouygues group) and 
EdF, which jointly own 51% of CIE through a subsidiary.  Starting in 1994, new “competing” 
generation independent power producers (IPPs) were commissioned: CIPREL (owned by SAUR 
and EdF) and Azito (owned by ABB, EdF and the Aga Khan group).  The power sector is fed by 
two offshore associated-gas investments that are owned by two consortia, one led by Ocean Energy 
and the other by Apache and Bouygues (Foxtrot). In 1994, a National Electricity Fund was 
established to ensure balanced financial management of power sector resources.  
 
Additionally, the Government reformed the regulatory framework in 1998, creating three entities 
including: (i) SOGEPE, which owns the assets on behalf of the Government and which monitors 
the financial flows in the system; (ii) ANARE, the economic regulator, which monitors the 
performance of the companies, recommends tariffs, and settles disputes; and (iii) SOPIE, which 
purchases the power from the IPPs, supervises the investment program and monitors dispatch.  
This system has led to the proliferation of official institutions with overlapping functions and 
responsibilities, and unsurprisingly, the division of labor between the different entities (CIE and 
EECI in particular) has never worked in practice
53: CIE is responsible for generation and 
distribution, but does not control either investment or maintenance; yet, the investment structure 
can only work when the sector is in financial equilibrium, which has not been the case since 1999.  
 
This confusion naturally creates tensions, as the Government alleges that there has been over-
billing for services by CIE since 1990, and that CIE has overstated the level of rural connections 
completed.  On the competition front, despite the presence of so-called independent power 
producers, the sector remains heavily controlled by the Bouygues group and EdF, through their 
stakes in both CIE and IPPs, but also in the offshore gas consortiums, which is peculiar. This 
dominant position is unlikely to be challenged, as a bilateral agreement, signed in the Spring of 
2002 between the Government and the Bouygues group, allows  for a 20 years renewal of the 
electricity concession, thereby compromising any serious possibility of revisiting the structure of 
the sector. The deal, made in exchange for the building of a third bridge in the Abidjan lagoon, is 








                                                 
53 See TURKSON [2000], Chapter 3, pp.46-49. 
  32Box 3. Competition and Regulation. Some Country Evidence (continued) 
 
In Guinea, a well-documented case of the impact of improper regulation is the privatization of 
water distribution services. In 1989 Guinea signed a lease agreement with a French private 
consortium led by Compagnie Générale des Eaux and SAUR to operate the state-owned Société 
d’Exploitation des Eaux de Guinée (SEEG), to deliver water, bill and collect payment in 17 urban 
centers. The government, through the Société Générale des Eaux de Guinée (SONEG), retained 
ownership of the assets, responsibility for setting policy and tariffs, and channeling investment. 
Before the reform, the price of water was an artificially low US$0.12 per m
3, and it was initially 
projected that the average charge
 to consumers would need to rise to US$0.76 per m
3 in
 1995 and 
then fall back to US$0.68 to meet operational costs
54. The cost of phasing in increasing tariffs was 
funded by an IDA loan, and this subsidy was to decline as either periodic rate increases or 
efficiency gains reduced the need. However, by 1997 the price per m
3 stood at US$ 0.83, a near 
seven-fold increase from 1989, and more than 40 times the 1986 price. The price was very high by 
international standards and was considerably higher than in most other lease/concession 
arrangements in Asia and Latin America. Connection costs reached US$90, that is 60% of monthly 
average income of a high public servant, and the minimum bimonthly payment for service was 
about US$13.  With the high price of water from the network, many residents could not or would 
not pay for it: in 1994, nearly 12’000 connections were inactive because of non-payment
55. As put 
by NELLIS [2003] (p.4), “post-privatization, an essential commodity had become less affordable”. 
Arguably, the reform resulted in an increased connection rate (although slower than anticipated), 
rapid metering, improved water and service quality, improved bill collection from private 
consumer, higher total factor productivity and improved financial situation. However, the amount 
of unaccounted water remained above 40%, reflecting in part government payment arrears or non-
payment. 
 
Although the reasons behind the high price of water in Guinea remain unclear, one crucial factor 
was the institutional framework, combining overlapping responsibilities, weak regulation, weak 
judiciary and political influence. For instance, the division of investment responsibilities between 
SEEG and SONEG has led to significant delays and problems. On the regulation side, SONEG was 
responsible for monitoring SEEG, but suffered from a lack of autonomy (major decisions were 
made by the cabinet of the Minister and even to the Presidency), and to information asymmetries 
between SONEG and SEEG. Finally, implementation of the different contracts between SONEG 
and SEEG has been difficult, reflecting low administrative capacity and the absence of an 
independent judiciary. With this weak institutional setup, SEEG remained too dependent on the 
Government to cut-off government departments that did not pay their water bills, which 
contributed to pushing up water prices. And with poor regulatory oversight, SONEG had limited 
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  33g. Governance and Predation 
 
As reported in CAMPBELL WHITE & BHATIA [1998], transparency problems have affected 
the credibility of privatizations in most African countries, and hence, questioned the very 
nature of competition introduced following the privatization of state owned enterprises. In 
a thought-provoking book on the politics of patronage in Africa, TANGRI [1999] claims 
“where states elites have been able to direct and manage closely the privatization process 
and, in particular, ensure that privatization transactions maintain rather than undermine 
political support for themselves, the governments have been less unwilling to undertake 
public sector divestiture programmes” (p.57). The political obstacles to privatization have 
been actually weaker than expected, and on occasion, political leaders have used 
privatization as a way of recentralizing power, reasserting presidential control over 
patronage networks, and weakening political contenders
56. Many allegations of corruption 
have appeared in the local press of nearly all countries, fed by some of the features of 
many privatization transactions in Sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, the choice of 
enterprises to be privatized has not followed transparent criteria, Second, information 
about transactions has rarely been subject to publications in the early stages of 
privatization programs. Third, final approval of  transactions was often a government 
prerogative, confined to a small group of state officials. Fourth, the use of privatization 
proceeds has rarely been transparent
57. Fifth,  the financial arrangements of some 
apparently competitive transactions have revealed shocking details, leading people to 
suspect political patronage
58. Of course, one should be cautious about sorting the real cases 
from politically motivated accusations. In addition, some of the alleged problems were not 
specific to privatization only, but applied to business practices in the private and the public 
sector, despite the fact that similar abuses did not enjoy wide press coverage
59. With this 
caveat in mind, there are some well documented cases reported by watchdogs such as 
Transparency International or scholars
60, which are worth looking at. A sample of these 
cases is given in Box 4.  
 
Skeptics could argue that the initial redistribution of assets during privatization is not a 
serious issue, first because privatization itself will create new incentives for behaving in an 
economically efficient way, and second because the market is likely to reallocate assets to 
efficient owners over time. These arguments may however have little bearing on most 
African countries for two reasons: first, incentives may still be distorted when both 
competition and regulation issues are not properly addressed, particularly when existing 
private stakeholders can secure “preferential” treatment from the authorities and lock the 
market, and second, in the absence of developed capital markets, asset reallocation is 
simply not taking place.  
 
                                                 
56 See VAN DE WALLE [2001] pp.162-164. On the same issue, see also HIBOU [1999]. 
57 In Uganda for instance, privatization receipts were place off budget in a “divestiture account” to be used 
for paying off public enterprise debts, compensating workers for job losses and other “unspecified” purposes; 
yet, the legislation was so vague on accounting procedures that various allegations of misuse of funds and 
asset-stripping have been voiced by Parliament. See DAVIS, OSSOWSKI et.alt. [2000], p.5. 
58 In Ghana for instance, the properties of ATS Motors were reported to have been handed over to the buyers 
as collateral security for a bank loan before the required initial payment for the purchase was made. 
59  
60 For instance,  TANGRI [2001], pp,117-133. 
  34Of course, things have to be put into perspective. Privatization programs have been subject 
to widespread corruption in other regions of the world as well, and in particular in   
transition countries such as Russia
61. In the absence of a reliable database, it is impossible 
to claim that privatization-related corruption is “worse” or “better” in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in Transition countries or in Latin America. Suffice it to say, privatization offers 
important corruption opportunities, particularly for large transactions, regardless of the 
region specifics. The important message is that, as elsewhere, the reputation cost of some 
big corruption scandals involved in privatization transactions has contributed to 
discrediting privatization programs in many countries and this has led to a major 
perception problem about the credibility of privatizations which is now difficult to 
overcome.  
 
Box 4. Governance & Predation. Some country evidence 
 
The case of Uganda Commercial Bank - Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) was the largest 
commercial bank in the country, holding nearly 50% of the commercial bank deposits and having 
the largest branch network in Uganda. Preparations for UCB privatization began in 1994. An 
expatriate management team was retained, and in 1996, tenders were sought internationally with 
the assistance of Morgan Grenfell investment bank . Of the seven short-listed interested bidders, 
only Westmont Land of Malaysia submitted a formal bid of US$11 mn, which was accepted. An 
agreement was signed on October 27, 1997 to sell 49% of UCB equity to Westmont Land, with an 
option to purchase another 2%. The sale was formally completed only on April 30,1998, following 
various delays in meeting payment deadlines
62.  
 
Shortly after sale completion, it was discovered that the transaction had been financed by loans 
from Greenland bank, the private commercial bank of the Greenland Investments group (GIL) in 
which President Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, was a major shareholder. The Central Bank also 
discovered that UCB, while operating under Westmont-appointed management, had placed 
deposits with Greenland Bank in excess of the amount that had been advanced to Westmont to 
finance the purchase of shares of UCB. Likewise, UCB began extending unsecured loans worth 
some US$40 mn to companies associated with GIL and to interests owned by Salim Saleh
63. The 
Central Bank, had to move in to manage both UCB and Greenland, until the latter's final closure in 
April 1999. The deal with Westmont was called off. The Central Bank also confirmed subsequently 
that there was a “secret agreement” between the two parties whereby Westmont was a “briefcase” 
company representing GIL interests. Salim Saleh admitted in December 1998 to buying UCB 
through GIL “to prevent it falling into the hands of foreign investors” among other reasons
64. He 
was also involved in other privatization scandals. Yet, criminal investigation was not been deemed 
necessary by the Select Investigation Committee of Parliament in its final October 1999 report, in 
contradiction with its November 1998 interim report. After two years of management by the 
Central Bank, and amid considerable Parliament’s opposition, UCB was again tendered for bidders 
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  35Box 4. Governance & Predation. Some country evidence (continued) 
 
 
Zambia’s ZZCM Luanshya mine – The sale of the Luanshya mine to India’s Binani Group in 
June 1997 has been subject to various allegations of corruption
65. Although these allegations are 
difficult to verify, the circumstances of the sale are very dubious: The Zambian Privatization 
Agency (ZPA) had been indeed negotiating the sale of the mine and had already identified 
Canada’s First Quantum Minerals as the “preferred bidder”, but shortly after the decision to sell 
Luanshya Mine to First Quantum, the Committee of Ministers intervened and ordered the ZPA 
Board to meet the following day to “consider another bid”. The bidders were given a 48-hour 
ultimatum to submit fresh bids. When the bids were opened, it was discovered that the Binani 
Group had bettered that of First Quantum Minerals by a marginal fraction. First Quantum Minerals 
sued the Zambian government and the Binani Group, arguing that the contents of its bid must have 
been leaked to Binani. The evidence presented to the Court showed that ZPA officials doubted the 
Binani’ Group’s pledge to retain the 7000 plus workforce at Luanshya Mine, as well as the Group’s 
ability to raise capital to finance its development projects. Yet, the ZPA changed its mind, 
suggesting that it must have come under political pressure to sell the Mine to Binani. It appears 
indeed that the Binani Group (which incorporated the Luanshya assets into a new company called 
“RAMCOZ”), had no sound track record in the mining industry, no reasonable business plan, and 
ended up failing to pay its major creditors, failing to service its debt, and failing to pay 
retrenchment fees to redundant employees (as pointed out in section c). This scandal led to the 
resignation of the Attorney General, George Chilupe, who had the “final say” over the divestiture 
of state enterprises before the signature of the sale by the Finance Minister. According to the local 
press, it was found that the Attorney General was paid a substantial amount of money into his 
United Kingdom bank account for letting the sale go through despite all the irregularities marring 
the transaction. 
 
As of mid-2003, the case of the Luanshya mines is still unresolved. RAMCOZ has been placed 
under receivership  at the instance of Zambia National Commercial Bank, one of its largest 
creditors. A parliamentary report has identified asset-stripping, gross negligence, abuse of the 
Privatization Act and other malpractices, but under pressure from the Government, the Parliament 
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  36h. Consumer Benefits and Income Distribution Impact  
 
Since one of the objectives of privatization is to gear incentives towards demand while 
being subject to hard budget constraints, assessing the impact of privatization on   
consumer’s surplus and on welfare is a key issue. Unfortunately, these issues have rarely 
been addressed in a systematic basis. Only in Cote d’Ivoire (JONES, JAMMAL & GOKGUR 
[1999] have consumer surpluses been properly estimated. It turns out that that consumers 
benefited only modestly as a result of privatization, obtaining only 5% of the benefits. 
According to the authors, ex-ante sectoral performance, inherited structure and ex-post 
regulatory policies are important explanatory factors. In Guinea, the same methodology 
was used in the water sector only, and the results show that consumers achieved almost 
60% of the benefits
67, despite the fact that water prices increased by 700% between 1989 
and 1997, and that the physical network expanded less than originally anticipated
68.  In 
other countries, the picture is patchy and anecdotal, but price increases following 
privatization seem to be the rule, together with an increase in coverage, however limited to 
urban areas. Given the great deal of sector variation, assessing benefits accruing to 
consumers on an average basis remains very difficult. In former public utilities, it is still 
early to assess whether access to services and coverage has increased depending on the 
sectors.  As a general rule, the experience with transportation, water and electricity is  
mixed, whereas the experience with Telecom is clearly positive with the possible exception 
of Ghana. In the latter sector, privatization has almost invariably brought down fixed lines 
costs, and coverage has increased. The mobile phone market has literally taken off, but at 
the expense of further investment and maintenance in fixed line telephony, however. In 
this respect, a showcase example is MTN-Uganda, which overshot its expansion target by 
25% after two years of operation, instead of five as originally scheduled; as a result, 
teledensity increased by 250% between 1998 and 2000. Bank privatization has generally 
not led to a substantial increase in financial intermediation owing to structural 
impediments, which remain unaddressed in most countries (legal framework, role of the 
judiciary etc.). 
 
Another important dimension is the quality of products and services. This is difficult to 
assess, as consumer surveys are not generalized across Africa. Some partial enterprise 
surveys exist, offering the supply side perspective, but demand is still by and large ignored 
from the exercise. Without careful consideration of the counterfactual, causality is also 
difficult to establish. Notwithstanding these difficulties, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
the quality of privatized services (including customer services) has increased in some but 
not all cases. A flagship example is certainly Kenya Airways, which was turned into one 
the best African airline in terms of performance, reliability and service, after being 
privatized in 1996 with KLM as the strategic investor. Other examples include the water 
sector in Guinea, where the quality of water drastically improved post-privatization and 
Cote d’Ivoire, where the customer response rate in telecom services increased substantially 
post-privatization
69. In Ghana, an impact assessment study of privatization found that 50% 
of divested manufacturing respondent firms recorded considerable improvements in the 
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  37quality of their products as a result of stepped up quality insurance and control efforts
70. 
This still leaves out the other 50% though, and strangely enough, only gives the supply 
side of the story. 
 
Beyond general welfare considerations, assessing the distributional impact of privatization 
has received little attention in Sub-Sahara Africa’s context, mostly because of data 
limitations. Income distribution decomposition and consumption data are still very partial 
in most Sub-Saharan Africa, and do not allow for sophisticated statistical exercises. Equity 
considerations have therefore been by and large overlooked to date, although the tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity is definitely a crucial dimension in the current debate about 
the impact of privatization worldwide
71. The distributional impact of price increases for 
instance depend a lot on consumption patterns, access to goods and services for some 
income groups, and the existence of differentiated prices pre-privatization. Such 
considerations are particularly important in public utilities and infrastructures in particular 
while there have certainly less practical relevance in sectors such as oil and mining for 
instance.  In the absence of reliable statistics, no serious exercise can be attempted, and one 
is left with a handful of hypotheses resting on anecdotal evidence: 
 
  There doesn’t appear to be any association between privatization, poverty and income 
distribution trends  
As a general observation, it is important to note that poverty (defined as $1/day) generally 
increased across Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, as documented by SALA-I-MARTIN 
[2002]. There were considerable country differences however, as reported in Table 7, with 
the worse deterioration in poverty occurring in Nigeria (+48%) Madagascar (+ 27%) and 
Zambia (+27%) whereas the highest decline took place in Uganda (-22%). Very limited 
evidence on income distribution trends reported in Table 8 also shows large country 
variation, but in any case, data is too scarce to assess the potential role of privatization in 
those trends: “far-reaching privatizers”
72 such as Zambia, Kenya, or Ghana, appear at both 
ends of the spectrum, and the same can be said for less successful privatizers such as 
Nigeria and Ethiopia. 
 
  On average, the price increases following the privatization of some public utility 
services have only marginally affected the poor living in urban areas  
A priori, one could argue that public utility privatization could have negatively affected the 
urban poor, not only through price increases but also through cutting services to illegal 
users, thus breaking an inefficient yet implicit “welfare contract” between the government 
and the poor.  However appealing, this may not hold for various reasons. Using the water 
sector as an example, one can argue that in all cases, water quality and safety increased 
dramatically after privatization. This implies that, as documented by Menard & Clarke 
[2000] in the case of Guinea, publicly supplied water was an important vector of disease 
prior to privatization. Thus, it may hard to argue that the cracking down on all those taping 
water illegally for instance has really contributed to worsen their situation in making them 
dependent on unsafe water compared to pre-privatization times. The situation is similar in 
the electricity sector, where frequent power outages and discharges often resulted in huge 
                                                 
70 APPIAH-KUBI [2001], p.217. 
71 See BIRDSALL & NELLIS [2002]. 
72 Defined in terms of percentage of SOEs divested, as reported in Table 1. 
  38voltage variations and thus in damages. With higher electricity prices yet better managed 
electricity delivery, it is hard to make a case for the worsening of the poor’s situation. 
Overall, it is intuitive to think that the urban poor have been very relatively unaffected by 




Table 7. Poverty trends in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 1998 
 
Countries with an increase 
in poverty rates  
Countries with no change 
in poverty rates 
Countries with a decline in poverty 
rates 
Burundi 





















Note: Poverty is defined as less than 1$/day 
Source: SALA-I-MARTIN [2002]. 
 
 
Table 8. Gini Index trends in the 1990s 
 
Country  Time 1  Time 2 
Ghana 33.9 39.6 
Guinea 46.8  40.3 
Kenya 57.4 44.5 
Nigeria 45  50.6 
Senegal 53.1  41.3 
Uganda 39.2  37.4 
Zambia 46.2  52.2 
 
Note: Time 1 and Time 2 are not uniform across countries. Generally, Time 1 is located in the first 
half of the 1990s whereas Time 2 is located in the second half of the 1990s except in the case of 
Guinea and Kenya where both observations are from the first half of the 1990s. 
 






                                                 
73 One further element in favor of this hypothesis is that this generally corresponds to what has been observed 
elsewhere, and most notably in Latin America’s urban centers, as documented by MCKENZIE  & 
MOORKHERJEE [2003]. 
  39  On average, the effect of privatization on the poor living in rural areas has been neutral 
except in a limited number of negative cases 
Rural areas have been relatively unaffected by most privatization transactions and hence, it 
is intuitive to think that the poverty picture has not fundamentally changed. The one 
possible exception includes divestitures resulting in large employment layoffs in rural 
areas and where large segments of the surrounding population depended directly or 
indirectly on the SOE’s activities: a possible example is the case of Luanshya &Baluba 
copper mines in Zambia (see section 3d). 
 
 
To conclude, it is not an overstatement to claim that social aspects and impacts of 
privatizations have been by and large overlooked, reflecting the tendency to focus on 
privatization transactions, rather than on sector reorganization at large, including wider 
social objectives. Given the paucity of data, the rest is a matter of conjecture. At this 
juncture, one is tempted to believe that the income distribution impact of privatization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is at best neutral, at worse negative as the previous implicit ”welfare 
contract” is breached.  People living in extreme poverty have almost certainly not been 
affected at all either way by privatization programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. But both the 
impact of privatization on some services and the net employment reduction in divested 




4. Some Lessons 
 
With the broad overview presented in the previous sections, what are the main lessons to 
be drawn from the experience with privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa at this juncture?  
 
One important lesson is that there is a general perception problem with the achievements 
of privatization, linked to unrealistic ex-ante expectations. At the risk of over-
generalization, and although additional post-privatization assessment of enterprise 
performance are needed to draw firm conclusions, it is tempting to say that privatization 
represented more a damage-limitation exercise than an economic booster. This is already 
quite an achievement given the starting point of many SOEs. Most privatizations took 
place in the context of highly imperfect market competition, obvious political patronage, 
absence of regulations, weak institutional capacities, and fragile macroeconomic 
stabilization. In addition, most of the divested firms were in desperate financial situations, 
crippled by debt and short of liquidity. Under such conditions, the difficult context of 
privatizations mattered even more than the transactions per se. With this caveat in mind, it 
is not surprising that privatizations yielded mixed results in Sub-Saharan Africa, with large 
differences across sectors and projects. It has not been a plain disaster, but it has not been 
an outright success either. It has, however, been somewhat better than public perceptions. 
Therefore, depicting the picture as half full or half empty is very much a matter of 
perceptions and ex-ante expectations. What seems obvious is that donors, technical 
advisers and policy makers, have all suffered from an illusion bias regarding the possible 
achievements of privatization given the difficult business and institutional environment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the simplistic way privatization was sold to the general public 
created very high expectations, which could not possibly be met, resulting in the overall 
  40perception of “failure”. It is pretty clear for instance that privatization has been oversold 
with regard to the alleged net fiscal benefits associated with privatization, private sector 
investment and job creation, except in a few specific success stories. The reality check has 
been hard-hitting, but rather than stressing the disappointing “impact” of privatization, it is 
certainly more relevant to wonder what else could have been done (the usual 
counterfactual puzzle). The counterfactual is certainly difficult to find given the above-
mentioned conditions prevailing in most countries, and any useful discussion would 
involve case specifics aspects. That is not to say that the privatization strategy (unbundling 
activities or not, privatization versus liquidation etc.) was appropriate in all transactions, 
but this would require in depth study of its own.  The general lesson for future 
privatizations is to tackle this key perception problem first by putting the achievements and 
deceptions of privatization transactions in perspective, by being more realistic about the 
impact of a particular project, and even more importantly, by having a more sector-
oriented approach rather than a transaction-focused approach in which privatizations are 
part of a series of interconnected structural changes. 
 
Second, there is a general recognition that privatization has been heavily donor-driven, 
which has generated a reform ownership problem and sometimes an unfortunate bias in 
the sales price negotiations. Individual privatization transactions have been often linked to 
World Bank and IMF disbursements, as donors placed a lot of emphasis on the number of 
transactions, and influenced the timing and pace of privatization
74. The World Bank and 
other donors have often initiated much of the design work in the face of low government 
commitment or consensus, leading to weak ownership
75. Against this background, 
privatization has often been perceived as a donor requirement but rarely as an economic 
necessity from an efficiency standpoint. The stated objectives of privatization have hardly 
been more than window dressing: with the exception of Zambia and Ghana, the stated 
objectives appeared to be fairly general, not transaction specific, and were sometimes only 
remotely linked to privatization per se
76. What seems obvious is that the need to meet IMF 
& World Bank conditionality in order to get financial assistance and the need to address 
the desperate financial situation of some SOEs were the dominant forces behind 
privatization policies. With limited government commitment and huge donor pressure, the 
outcome of privatization is not fundamentally different from that of other structural 
reforms: uneven. Thus, it can never been emphasized enough that government commitment 
is fundamental, and that neither conditionality nor other pressures can substitute for that. 
This is even more crucial nowadays, since virtually all the “basket-case” SOEs have been 
liquidated and the debate is now firmly focused on some key infrastructure utilities such as 
water. 
 
Third, privatization has created new political patronage opportunities, which need to be 
addressed in order to reestablish credibility in the privatization process. This is certainly 
neither worse nor better than other instruments of patronage, but under the present highly 
imperfect competition situation, rents are still around, alive and kicking. As indicated in 
the previous section, this situation has led to several scandals, contributing to the serious 
                                                 
74 See CAMPBELL WHITE & BHATIA [1998], pp.26-34 and chapter 7 for a discussion of this crucial issue. 
75 CAMPBELL WHITE & BHATIA [1998], p.43. 
76This reflects the fact that very often, privatization was part of a broader program of public enterprises 
reform where the objectives were defined for the entire program. 
  41damage associated with the credibility of the privatization process. This is all the more 
unfortunate because privatization has often been sold as a solution to the endemic 
corruption problem plaguing state-owned enterprises. The main lesson here is that future 
privatizations must seriously address the current credibility gap. This involves cracking 
down on existing allegations of corruption as well as offering tangible proof regarding the 
effective transparency of future privatization deals in order to restore public confidence. 
Both governments and donors have a role to play in this very challenging task. The first 
proposition is politically sensitive as it involves targeting all actors suspected of 
corruption, including foreign firms. This is important because there is a widespread 
perception in Sub-Saharan Africa that donors are “covering up” for large private firms. In 
this respect, there are already some encouraging first steps: the first is that OECD countries 
have accepted to take measures against their firms taking bribe abroad; the second is that 
the World Bank is also slowly recognizing the problem: in the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project implemented in the early nineties, a number of consulting firms and contractors 
working on the project have been charged with paying bribes and their trial is currently 
under way with the Bank paying for the prosecution of the case
77. In addition, the Bank has 
also come up with a “black list” of firms and individuals ineligible to be awarded a Bank-
financed contract because they were found to have violated the fraud and corruption 
provisions of the Bank’s internal guidelines
78. On the side of governments, progress is also 
being made. In Mozambique for instance, the Banco Commercial de Moçambique (BCM) 
case (see Box 1) took 2 years to come to court and a warrant has now been issued for the 
arrest of the former attorney general, who is suspected of corruption. The second 
proposition, insuring transparency, requires innovative methods to make sure than even 
public tendering are not bypassed at the last minute by governance interference. This can 
be achieved if donors or specialized agencies take on the reputation risk in supervising the 
process and making sure that there is proper competition for the market, especially in 
public utilities. For instance, the International Financial Corporation (IFC) has been 
advising governments through its private sector advisory services facility in a number of 
recent privatization deals in Sub-Saharan Africa including in Gabon (water sector), 
Cameroon (electricity sector), Uganda (telecoms) and Kenya (Kenya Airways). Given the 
active lending role of various arms of the Bank in Africa (IDA lending, IFC lending, 
MIGA guarantee), credibility in being perceived as a neutral broker may be an issue in 
some cases
79, so alternatively, international governance watchdogs such as Transparency 
International could also help supervise the transactional aspects and offer their seal of 
respectability on the deal, as suggested by NELLIS [2003]. 
 
Fourth, while privatization may be instrumental in creating a competitive framework, it is 
only a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. This is of crucial importance for the 
economic efficiency of the economic sectors in which privatized firms operate. Experience 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere suggests that the link between privatization and 
                                                 
77 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL  [2001], p.63. Interestingly enough, the World Bank Oversight Committee 
for Fraud and Corruption is also investigating the alleged corruption, but its conclusions are still pending 
(see WORLD BANK [2002a], p.19). 
78 The list can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/debarr.html  
79 One obvious example of potential conflicts of interest is the situation of Cote d’Ivoire’s electricity sector, 
which is dominated by the Bouyges Group (France) and by private firms with IFC stakes.. Under such a 
setting, one would think that an IFC advisory mandate to restructure the whole sector would raise some 
conflicts of interest issues. Interestingly, such a mandate was seriously considered in 2002. 
  42private sector development is far from evident, as privatization does not necessarily lead to 
increased competition in the absence of a proper framework
80. This does not suggest that 
that effective competition can be created without privatization, but  that privatization is 
only the first step in fostering competition. Competition has often been “captured” by 
private operators, which have been eager to negotiate exclusive rights and preferential 
treatment. This has favored collusive behavior, cartel arrangements, and abuse of dominant 
position. This is certainly not new: some private firms had been granted preferential 
treatment in the 1980s in some countries
81. In this regard, effective domestic regulation and 
competition frameworks are still the cornerstones of successful post-privatization 
environments. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be dealt with in a vacuum, and are part of 
the general institutional capacity deficiencies of most countries, most notably in the legal 
and judiciary system. In competitive sectors, one obvious example is the financial sector, 
which is dominated by commercial banks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite some problems 
and failures (most notably in Mozambique and in Uganda), privatization of commercial 
banks has led to obvious improvements in the financial sector: reckless lending has 
stopped, so has the drain on public resources, and the sector is financially much sounder 
than a decade ago in all countries which experienced bank privatization. Problems do 
however remain. Bank profitability is by and large due to large consumer fees, but does not 
result from bank intermediation returns. Competition is very limited, reflecting a high 
banking concentration ratio
82, and the savings base remains at basement levels. 
Consequently, banks do very little bank intermediation and the market is often 
characterized by excess liquidity, yet private sector financing is scarce and banks are not 
keen on extending loans. This picture summarizes the major paradox of some 
privatizations, as the economic behavior of banks is perfectly rational given the high risks 
associated with the business environment in which they have to operate. Table 9, which 
compiles firm surveys in 18 African countries, gives a broad overview of the red tape faced 
by businesses including banks in terms of length and costs of various procedures (without 
bribes, however). The proper enforcement of contracts at the level of the judiciary system
83 
is by far the most serious problem that commercial banks typically face, which goes 
beyond red tape considerations. Political interference, corruption and a very unfortunate 
jurisprudence favoring debtors versus creditors in some cases, are the most serious 
constraints. Under such conditions, it is perfectly logical that financial intermediation is 
virtually non-existent, and bank privatization does not change this fundamental 
institutional impediment. In non-competitive sectors such as water and electricity 
distribution, the obvious problem is the regulatory contract between the service provider 
and the authorities, which is critical to avoid abuses, but also to secure investment, define 
access targets and deal with key social issues such as tariff rebalancing and cross-
                                                 
80 On this point, see OECD[2003], p.33. 
81 One good example is Senegal’s “conventions spéciales” giving absolute monopoly power, exclusive 
import licenses, tax relief and free capital transfers in the sectors of cement, sugar and tomato paste. 
82 Just as a matter of illustration, 80% of deposits is held by the five largest banks. 
83 One extreme case is certainly Cameroon, where not only are financial guarantees non-enforceable, but the 
regional Central Bank (BEAC) has also agreed -if not helped- judges to access central banks offices and seize 
bank accounts to cover the debt owed to third parties, taking advantage of the implementation loopholes of 
the OAHADA (harmonization of business law) framework in Cameroon. This practice, known as “saisie-
attribution”, was identified thanks to vigorous IMF pressures on the government, but effective corrective 
measures are yet to take place. 
  43subsidization. But here again, the typical problems have to do with regulation enforcement 
and conflict resolution.  
 
Table 9. Business Environment Indicators 
(As of January 2002) 
 
  ENTRY REGULATIONS  CONTRACT 
ENFORCEMENT 
INSOLVENCY 
  Start-up 
procedures 
Time to 
























Benin 9  63 168  44  248 1150  18 
Burkina Faso  15  39  328  24  376  ..  .. 
Cameroon 13  56  197  46  548 328  18 
Cote d’Ivoire  10  91  136  18  150  800  18 
Ethiopia 8  44  429  24  895  .. .. 
Ghana 10  126 98  21  90  591  18 
Kenya 11  68  44  25  255  1667  18 
Madagascar 15  68  58  29  166  800  18 
Malawi 11  56  94  12  108  ..  .. 
Mali 13  61  230 27 150  1278  18 
Mozambique 16  214  74 18  540  .. .. 
Niger 11  27  390  29  365  ..  .. 
Nigeria 9  50  92  12  87  336  1 
Senegal 9  58  116  30  335  ..  .. 
South Africa  9  32  7  18  207  730  18 
Tanzania 13  37  229  14  127  1095  8 
Uganda  17  36 114  16  99  730  38 
Zambia 6  40  43  16  188  1365  8 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Database, 2003 
 
 
So what is to be done? First of all, it is time to recognize that there are costs associated 
with the creation and maintenance of regulatory and competition institutions. The biggest 
failure is certainly to have tried to sell privatization as an efficient cost-cutter for cash-
strapped countries, hoping that free market forces would do the rest. Most African 
governments have “discovered” that setting the right market environment and regulations 
framework entailed costs in the short run. These costs can be perceived as investing into 
future private sector development, but they must be addressed. Second, institution and 
capacity building must be part of the reform agenda in a more systematic way. Institution 
building is not well covered in economic theory and has only gained recognition in the late 
1990s
84, but there is now a consensus among donors that most structural reforms are 
unable to deliver tangible results under the current institutional setting. This is, however, a 
formidable challenge for governments, populations and donors, as institutional reform is 
intrinsically linked to political, sociological and cultural factors, which evolve slowly over 
time.  Some “shortcuts” or “stopgap” measures can be worked out in some specific sectors, 
such as the contacting out of regulatory services or the recourse to specific contracts 
generally arbitrated offshore and enforced by international treaty. However, such devices 
alone do not offer any long-term solution to the institution building problem per se, as they 
simply bypass rather than build domestic capacity.  Technical assistance and capacity 
building financed by donors to design regulatory agencies can help along the way, 
                                                 
84 See WORLD BANK [2002b] 
  44especially if the focus is on relatively simple systems. The World Bank, for instance, has 
begun to explore the feasibility and desirability of establishing global principles for the 
design of regulatory regimes as well as a certification program for regulatory 
practitioners
85. Such efforts are useful to a certain extent, but their ingestion must be home-
grown to be sustainable over time. The bottom line is that this process is bound to take 
time, as it involves fundamental changes in terms of power relations. If one accepts this 
analysis, the most tricky policy question is whether of not to go ahead with privatization 
where the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks are weak, and likely to remain so 
for some time. In other words, if institution building takes time to materialize, what is to be 
done in the meantime ? Given the complexity of the issues involved, no simple answer can 
give justice to this classic dilemma. In the light of the experience with privatization 
documented in this paper, it is obvious that the real issue is how to tackle infrastructure 
privatization, and former public utilities in particular. In such sectors, it can be argued that 
speed may not be the essence, and setting up a basic institutional environment prior to the 
privatization seems to be favorable, complemented with some of the “stopgap” measures 
identified above. By contrast, institutional issues matter far less in tradable sectors, so 
privatization policies should be not be affected.  
 
Fourth, one of the important lessons of the last decade in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the 
distributional impact of privatization has, by and large, been overlooked.  As a result, we 
know relatively little about the social impact of privatizations. This is where the fiscal 
logic of most privatization transactions (maximize the transaction value in order to produce 
a positive fiscal effect) is in contradiction with the costs associated with cross-
subsidization schemes and other pro-poor spending, which are critical to expand coverage 
of certain former public utility services like water and electricity. These social objectives 
are intrinsically linked to the above-mentioned regulation issue. Therefore, intended 
privatizations need to be subject to prospective welfare analysis from the point of view of 
the society as a whole. This is an awareness exercise which has implications for sector 
strategy, proper regulation details, and poverty reduction strategies. Depending on the 
starting point, some important redistributive effects are unavoidable, but it is important  to 
be able to gauge these dynamic effects in order to be best prepared to sell such reforms to 






More empirical studies are needed, most notably at the level of post-privatization 
performance and at the welfare analysis level, to refine and nuance the sometimes 
impressionistic conclusions of this study. At this juncture, what is striking is that while 
most authors agree that privatization can yield very positive results “if and when done 
properly”, experience in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that issues and pitfalls have not 
                                                 
85 A number of initiatives were taken in 2001-2002, aimed at exploring the feasibility and desirability of 
developing an individual certification program.  These included: a) a needs-assessment covering regulatory 
agencies in Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia; b) a report on the governance and administration 
structures of various certification programs; and c) a convention of regulatory experts (in May 2002), to 
discuss the possibility of developing a certification program for regulatory professionals. 
  45fundamentally changed between 1991 and 2002. The Campbell-White & Bathia’s study 
and the “ten commandments” of African privatization developed by the IFC
86 (11 
actually…) still capture the thrust of the privatization challenge. For sure, political 
commitment, proper transparency, regulation and competition frameworks have been 
repeatedly emphasized by scholars and practitioners of privatization in Africa and 
elsewhere over time, but they are still at the forefront of privatization concerns. This 
suggests that institutional transformation and by extension, fundamental changes in 
business environments, have been the weakest link in the reform agenda and have 
undermined the operational credibility of privatization. The resulting perception problem 
in African public opinions is an additional challenge in the political economy of reform: 
carefully studying available evidence, understanding what has worked and what has not 
worked and trying to better assess the likely consequences of future privatization for the 
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86 See http://www.ifc.org/publications/pubs/impact/impsm99/commandm/commandm.html.  The “10 
commandments” are: 1. Thou canst lead thy horse to water, but verily… ; 2. Know thy priorities; 3. And 
there shall come forth a host of thine enemies…; 4. Privatization must bringeth forth the benefits; 5. Money 
is NOT the root of all privatization; 6. Fatten thy calf before the slaughter; 7. Competitive bids bringeth 
better bargains; 8. Involveth all stakeholdersp; 9. Privatization costeth money (a lot of it); 10. Thou shalt 
regulate; 11. Thou shalt choose good advisers 
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